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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
V.

PEARL TOPANOTES,

CaseNo.2001027-SC

Defendant/Petitioner

In the underlying appeal to this case, Petitioner Pearl Topanotes challenged the
trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. See State v. Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311,fflf3-8,14 P.3d 695.
According to the facts, the officers retained possession of Topanotes' property and
detained her as a matter of routine practice to run a warrants check. The officers acknowledged that at the time of the detention, they did not have reasonable suspicion to believe
Topanotes was involved in criminal activity. See id.; also State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d
616, 617 (Utah 1987) (level-two detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion).
During the unlawful detention, the officers discovered a warrant for Topanotes1
arrest. They executed the warrant and searched her. The search produced heroin, which
gave rise to the charge in this case. Topanotes moved in the trial court to suppress the
evidence discovered during the unlawful detention, and the court denied the motion.
On appeal, the state conceded the trial court erred in its ruling, where the officers
lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to support the level-two detention. (State's Brief

of Appellee, dated May 15, 2000 ("Brief of Appellee"), at 6.)1
Notwithstanding the concession, the state asked the court of appeals to affirm the
trial court's ruling on an alternative ground raisedfor thefirsttime on appeal According
to the state, the inevitable-discovery doctrine rendered the unlawfully seized evidence
admissible under the Fourth Amendment. (Brief of Appellee at 7-11.) The state asked
the court of appeals in a footnote to remand the case in order that the trial court may
consider application of the inevitable discovery doctrine in this matter. (Id. at 11, n.3.)
On November 9, 2000, the court of appeals issued a decision in the case. It ruled
the officers violated Topanotes' Fourth Amendment rights when they unlawfully detained
her for the warrants check. Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311, ^8. The court also considered
the state's argument regarding inevitable-discovery. However, it refused to reach the
merits of the issue. Instead, the court of appeals ordered a remand in the case to the trial
court "for a factual determination on whether the heroin would have been inevitably
discovered and for such proceedings as may be appropriate." Id. at^|12.
This Court granted Topanotes' Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
In this Court, Topanotes is challenging the court of appeals' remand as it relates to
the inevitable-discovery doctrine for two reasons. First, the court of appeals should have

1 In papers filed with this Court, the state likewise has admitted the officers' conduct
was unlawful. (State's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, dated March
28, 2001, at 2-3 (state conceded that officers engaged in an unlawful detention); Brief of
Respondent, dated January 15, 2002, at 2, 5-6 ("Brief of Resp.").)
2

resolved the issue on appeal, since the inevitable-discovery doctrine was raised first in
that court as an alternative ground for affirmance. The court of appeals' failure to
resolve the issue on the existing record constituted error. See infra. Argument.
The state in part does not dispute that point; indeed, the state also is requesting
resolution of the inevitable-discovery issue on the existing record. (See Brief of Resp. at
15-21 .)2 That would be appropriate under Utah law and the doctrine of affirming on
alternative grounds raised for the first time on appeal. To that end, this Court should find
that the inevitable-discovery doctrine is not applicable here. See infra subpoint C, below.
Second, Topanotes maintains that the court of appeals erred when it remanded the
matter to the trial court for further proceedings, which may entail another evidentiary
hearing. Such a remand would be unprecedented under Utah law.
The state disagrees. It seems to claim that Utah appellate courts permit remand to
allow an appellee to develop an issue in the trial court that it raised first on appeal. According to the state, if its theory on appeal lacks an evidentiary basis, it is the "practice1' in
this jurisdiction (i) to remand the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing if the
state is relying on a new theory on appeal; but (ii) to reject remand if the state is relying
on the theory it originally developed in the trial court. (Brief of Resp. at 9.)

2 The issue raised in the state's "Brief of Conditional Cross-Petitioner" is fairly included
in the issues raised in Topanotes' Brief of Petitioner (October 4, 2001). Consequently,
Topanotes has addressed the state's issue concerning application of the inevitablediscovery doctrine in part in this Reply Brief. See infra subpoint C; Brief of Petitioner,
dated October 4, 2001, at Point LB; see also Brief of Conditional-Cross Respondent.
3

The state's argument concerning the "practice" is not supported by relevant case
law or analysis; it is unreasonable and should be disregarded for the reasons more fully
discussed below. See infra subpoints A and B.
As set forth herein, and as set forth in Topanotes' additional filings with this Court,
the inevitable-discovery doctrine is inapplicable to this case. In addition, it was improper
for the court of appeals to order remand for further proceedings on the matter.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS
SHOULD BE REVERSED WITHOUT REMAND FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS ON THE INEVITABLE-DISCOVERY DOCTRINE.
Topanotes does not dispute that an appellate court may decide an issue raised for
the first time on appeal as an alternative ground for affirmance. This Court has stated the
following with respect to the doctrine:
[I]t is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from
"if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even
though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the
basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory was
not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and
was not considered or passed on by the lower court."
Dipomav.McPhie, 2001 UT 61, Tfl8, 29 P.3d 1225 (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk
Producers Ass'n. 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (Utah 1969)).
Topanotes likewise does not take issue with the following assertion set forth in the
state's brief: "This Court has previously recognized that affirmance on an alternative
ground 'does not deprive a party of a due process [right],' and [] it is not a prerequisite of
4

the doctrine that the alternative ground first be raised in the trial court." (Brief of Resp. at
10 (citing Dipoma; DeBrv v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995)).)
Utah courts have specified that before an appellate court may affirm on an
alternative ground raised first on appeal, the alternative ground must be apparent on the
exiting record. See Dipoma, 2001 UT 61, ^[18 ("because the alternative ground for
affirmance presented by [appellee/petitioner] is apparent on the record and was briefed
and argued by the parties on appeal, we choose to address if (emphasis added)); State v.
Finlavson. 2000 UT 10, ^31, 994 P.2d 1243 (where the court has a "complete factual
record" it "may affirm a judgment of a lower court if it is sustainable on any legal ground
or theory apparent on the record"); Limb. 461 P.2d at 293 n.2 ("a trial court should be
affirmed if on the record made it can be"); State v. Wells. 928 P.2d 386, 390-92 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996) (addressing and rejecting an alternative Fourth Amendment argument raised
by the state for the "first time on appeal"), affd. State v. Wells. 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah
1997) (unanimously affirming court of appeals' analysis); State v. Chevre. 2000 UT App
6, f 12, 994 P.2d 1278 (appellate court may affirm where the legal ground raised first on
appeal was "apparent on the record"); State v. Montova. 937 P.2d 145, 149-50 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) {refusing to affirm on alternative ground raised first on appeal where the
ground was not apparent on the record).
Thus, under Utah law, if the record supports the appellee's alternative ground for
affirmance, the appellate court will affirm the ruling of the lower court. See Chevre. 2000

5

UT App 6,fflfl2-17.On the other hand, if the record does not support the appellee's
newly raised theory, the appellate court may either reject the argument, or decline to
address it. See Dipoma, 2001 UT 61, Tfl8 (appellate court "choose[s],f to address
alternative ground for affirmance that is apparent from the record); Wells, 928 P.2d at
390-92 (addressing and rejecting appellee's alternative ground for affirmance where it
was not supported by the record), affd, 939 P.2d 1204 (unanimously affirming court of
appeals' analysis); Montoya, 937 P.2d at 150 (rejecting state's alternative ground for
affirmance where the grounds were not supported by the record).
The contrasting results set forth above represent the two sides of the same coin.
Application of the doctrine is clear and workable.
Under Utah law, this Court will not remand a case to the trial court for further
proceedings on an issue raised first on appeal, except in limited circumstances. See Utah
R. App. P. 23B (2001); State v. Litherland. 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92.
The state takes a different view of the matter. It claims Utah appellate courts will
remand some cases for another evidentiary hearing, where the state has raised a new
theory on appeal as an alternative ground for affirmance. (See Brief of Resp. at 8-9.)
That is, according to the state, the doctrine of "affirming on alternative grounds"
exists on a "continuum." (Id 7-8.) On one end of the state's "continuum" is Limb, where
the appellee has raised a new question of law as an alternative ground for affirmance.
According to the state, if a question of law is raised first on appeal, the appellate court

6

will decide the issue without "trial court clarification or further fact-finding." (Id.)
On the other end of the state's "continuum" is Montoya. where the appellee has
raised a fact-sensitive issue as an alternative ground for affirmance. According to the
state, if a fact-sensitive issue is raised for the first time on appeal and it is "clearly
rebutted in the record," the appellate court may resolve — and reject — the issue. (Id. at 8.)
The state claims that while Limb and Montoya "represent opposite ends of the
alternative grounds continuum" (Brief of Resp. at 7), all other matters exist somewhere
between those cases (the "in-between" cases (see id. at 9)) and are not resolved on appeal;
rather, the "in-between" cases are remanded to "the trial court to consider the adequacy of
an alternative ground for affirmance in the first instance, which may entail an additional
evidentiary hearing." (Brief of Resp. at 9.)3
In support of its claim regarding the "in-between" cases, the state has cited to Renn
v.Utah Board of Pardons. 904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995); State v. Strain. 779 P.2d 221 (Utah
1989); State v. Palmer. 803 P.2d 1249 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); and State v. Marshall. 791
P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990), rejected in part by

3
By definition, the state's theory is incorrect. The doctrine of affirming on
alternative grounds is an appellate concept. See Black's Law Dictionary at 59 (7th ed.
1999) (to "affirm" is "to confirm on appear). The appellate court accepts or rejects the
newly raised theory on appeal on the existing record as a possible ground for affirmance.
If the doctrine of "affirming on alternative grounds" applied only to issues on the
"opposite ends" of the state's "continuum" (Brief of Resp. at 7), it would not be called
the doctrine of affirming on alternative grounds. It would be the doctrine of "remanding"
an issue raised first on appeal for resolution in another tribunal.
7

State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99,1fi|44, 47, 37 P.3d 1073. Those cases do not support the
state's argument, as set forth below. The state's argument for remand must be rejected.
A. THE STATE'S RELIANCE ON RENN. STRAIN. PALMER. AND
MARSHALL IS MISPLACED.
1. The State Claims Renn. Strain. Marshall, and Palmer. Support the "Utah
Practice" to Remand a Fact-Sensitive Issue to the Trial Court for an Additional
Evidentiary Hearing and Consideration of an Alternative Ground Raised for the
First Time on Appeal. The Cases Do Not Support that Proposition.
(a) Renn v. Utah Board of Pardons. 904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995).
The state has cited to Renn in connection with its claim that this Court has
"remanded [a case] for consideration of alternative grounds for affirmance, including
further evidentiary hearing." (Brief of Resp. 7.) Renn does not stand for that proposition.
In Renn, a prison inmate filed a petition in district court for post-conviction relief
against the Board of Pardons. Renn, 904 P.2d at 680. The inmate made several claims
against the Board concerning his parole date and the date set for his next parole hearing.
Without reaching the merits of the petition, the trial court dismissed the matter on the
basis that it was barred by a three-month statute of limitations. Id.
The inmate appealed and the court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling; it
found the statute of limitations unconstitutional. See kL
Thereafter, the Board asked this Court to review the matter. This Court granted
the request. I d at 679-80. On review, among other things, the Board asked this Court to
affirm the trial court's dismissal on alternative grounds: the Board claimed the petition
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was frivolous, and it claimed the court of appeals "should have canvassed the record for
an alternative basis upon which to affirm the district court's11 dismissal. Id. at 684-85.
This Court rejected the Board's alternative arguments. It also affirmed "the Court
of Appeals' reversal and remand[ed the case] to the district court for an evaluation of the
issues raised in Renn's petition." Id. at 685 (emphasis added).
Contrary to the state's assertion, Renn does not stand for the proposition that a
case may be remanded to the trial court for the appellee to develop an alternative theory
raised first on appeal. (Brief of Resp. at 7.) Rather, under Renn if a trial court improperly
dismisses a petitioner's claims, the claims may be reinstated and litigated on the merits.
(b) State v. Strain. 779P. 2d 221 (Utah 1989).
Next, the state claims in Strain, this Court "remand[ed] for an evidentiary hearing
on possible alternative ground for affirmance, i.e., voluntariness of confession." (Brief of
Resp. at 7.) That is incorrect. In Strain, the state did not argue an alternative ground for
affirmance. Strain, 779 P.2d 221. Rather, this Court considered whether a motion to suppress should be reversed on grounds raised first in the trial court, but not decided there.
In Strain, defendant filed a motion to suppress a confession obtained in violation of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The trial court ultimately denied the motion,
and proceeded to trial on the charges, which resulted in a conviction. On appeal,
defendant challenged the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress on three grounds.
First, the defendant claimed the Miranda warnings were defective. Strain, 779

9

P.2d at 223. This Court disagreed. Id. at 224.

Second, the defendant claimed he did not

knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to remain silent and his right to counsel during
the interrogation. Id. at 224. This Court disagreed. Id. at 225.
Third, the defendant claimed the officer obtained the confession through coercion.
Id. at 225. This Court looked to the evidence of record and case law, it recognized the
officer's tactics were coercive, then it ruled that because the trial court did not address the
merits of that issue below, the case must be remanded. Id. at 227; see id. at 222 (in the
original trial court proceedings defendant challenged the confession because of "threats
and promises" made by the officer). Since the coercion issue in Strain was raised first in
the trial court, but not decided there, it was appropriate to remand the matter to that court
for a determination. See Rucker v. Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336, 1338-39 (Utah 1979) (this
Court will remand an issue that was presented to the trial court but not decided).
This Court did not remand the case in Strain for an evidentiary hearing on an alternative ground for affirmance raised first on appeal. Thus, Strain is not applicable here.
(c) State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249 (Utah Ct App. 1990).
Next, the state claims Palmer is "similar to this case." (Brief of Resp. at 7.) That is
incorrect. In Palmer, defendant moved to suppress a ring discovered during a warrantless
X-ray search of his body. In the original trial court proceedings, the state argued the ring
was admissible under alternative Fourth Amendment theories: First, the state claimed the
X-ray search was lawful under an "exigent circumstances" exception; and second, the

10

state "raised the theory of inevitable discovery." Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1253. The trial court
upheld the search under the state's first theory, idL at 1251, and defendant appealed.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling on the "exigent circumstances" exception, id. at 1253, and remanded the case to the trial court for a decision on
the inevitable-discovery issue, id, since it was first raised in that court. Id.
Under the law, it is proper to remand a case to the trial court for a decision on an
issue that was originally raised there. See Rucker, 598 P.2d at 1338-39. Since the state in
Topanotes' case did not raise inevitable-discovery in the trial court, Palmer is
inapplicable. There is no basis in this matter to remand the case.
(d) State v. Marshall 791 P. 2d 880 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Finally, the state claims Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, is applicable here. In Marshall
the court of appeals granted a petition for interlocutory appeal to consider a ruling on a
motion to suppress. Marshall 791 P.2d at 881. According to the evidence, the officer
initiated a traffic stop because defendant had malfunctioning equipment. Id The officer
became suspicious that defendant was transporting drugs when defendant responded to
questions in a manner in conflict with the car rental agreement. The officer requested
consent to search the car. When he came upon suitcases in the trunk, defendant claimed
they did not belong to him. Id. at 882. The officer discovered drugs in the suitcases. Id
On interlocutory appeal, defendant claimed he did not give consent to search the
suitcases. The state responded that defendant lacked standing to challenge the search,

11

where he represented the suitcases did not belong to him. Apparently, neither party
focused on the search of the suitcases in the trial court proceedings. Id, at 887. Nevertheless, on interlocutory appeal, both parties agreed the issues relating to the suitcases
were pivotal to the matter. See kL Given the "critical" importance of the newly raised
issues by the parties, the court of appeals remanded the interlocutory appeal for rehearing
on those specific matters. Id. at 890. Marshall is unique, where each party raised new
arguments on interlocutory appeal, necessitating remand for additional proceedings.
Marshall also is distinguishable from this case. The defendant in Marshall challenged the consent to search the suitcases for the first time on appeal. See Marshall, 791
P.2d at 887. Topanotes has not raised any new issue here. Where both parties in
Marshall considered their respective new positions on appeal to be "pivotal" to the matter,
remand would satisfy both parties' need to resolve those respective issues. Topanotes
does not consider the inevitable-discovery doctrine to be "pivotal" or "critical" here.
Topanotes maintains it is inapplicable. See infra, subpoint C.
Unlike the parties in Marshall Topanotes is not requesting remand in order to
resolve additional issues relating to the search and raised for the first time on appeal.
2. The State Has Failed to Cite to Any Authority for Its "Continuum" Theory.
The cases cited by the state do not support the proposition that Utah appellate
courts "have remanded for consideration of alternative grounds for affirmance, including
further evidentiary hearing[s], under circumstances similar to this case." (Brief of Resp.
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at 7.) In fact, the cases cited by the state are inapplicable. See Horton v. Goldmine^s
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Utah 1989) (where the case law cited by a party failed to
provide relevant analysis for the issue before the Court, the case law was not persuasive
to this Court or dispositive of the matter); see State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ^[6 n.2, 31 P.3d
528 (state relied on case law that was not dispositive).
In sum, the courts in Strain and Palmer did not consider an alternative ground for
affirmance raised for the first time on appeal; the Court in Renn rejected the state's alternative ground for affirmance and remanded the case to reinstate Renn's claims in the
post-conviction petition; and the court in Marshall found that remand was critical to both
parties, where each party raised new, "pivotal11 issues that required resolution. The state's
request for remand here is not supported by case law. It should be rejected.
B. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT FOR REMAND ON THE "INBETWEEN"CASES MUST BE REJECTED FOR POLICY REASONS.
It is well settled that the state bears the burden of establishing the admissibility of
evidence under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1263
(Utah 1993) (state bears burden of establishing admissibility under the Fourth
Amendment); State v. James. 2000 UT 80, ^}16, 13 P.3d 576 (prosecutor bears burden of
proof for application of inevitable-discovery doctrine).
If the state fails to present a sufficient evidentiary basis to support an officer's
conduct under the Fourth Amendment, the evidence discovered during an unlawful search
will be suppressed. See State v. Hodson, 907 P.2d 1155, 1159-60 (Utah 1995).
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Also, where the state has failed in its evidentiary burden, it is not entitled to an
order remanding the matter to the trial court for another evidentiary hearing. See State v.
Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1278-80 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (state failed to present sufficient evidence to support seizure; the state would not be allowed to cure deficiencies on remand);
Hodson, 907 P.2d at 1159-60 (the state carried the burden of proof; the state would not be
entitled to remand for new evidence); State v. Gutierrez. 864 P.2d 894, 903 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) (where the statefs argument lacked an evidentiary basis on appeal, state would
not be entitled to remand); Barnett v. United States, 525 A.2d 197, 200 (D.C. 1987); Ex
Parte Hergott 588 So. 2d 911, 916 (Ala. 1991) (remand would violate Double Jeopardy
Clause; state does not get second chance); see also State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1121
(Utah App. 1997) (remand ordered for further proceedings on the "evidence previously
presented to the trial court1'); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1140 (Utah 1994) (remand
for findings); State v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d 547, 548-50, 552 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (remand
for findings on the existing record), connected case. State v. GenovesL 909 P.2d 916, 919
(Utah Ct. App. 1995); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979) (remand for
proper findings in accordance with the evidence of record).
The state does not dispute the fundamental principles set forth above. The state
likewise does not dispute the law as set forth in Case, Hodson, and Gutierrez, prohibiting
remand for further evidentiary proceedings; or the law as set forth in Giron, Lopez,
Genovesi, and Rucker, allowing remand only for findings on the existing record.
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Rather, the state seems to argue that the cases cited above support competing standards under Utah law. According to the state, on the one hand, Utah appellate courts
prohibit further evidentiary hearings on remand if the state has failed to present sufficient
evidence to support a theory originally presented in the trial court, while Utah courts
allow remand for another evidentiary hearing if the state raises a new theory on appeal as
an alternative ground for affirmance. (See Brief of Resp. at 7-9.)
The state's competing standards are unreasonable. The differing standards serve to
reward the prosecutor who withholds evidence and argument in the original proceedings.
Such a prosecutor would be entitled to have his case remanded on appeal for another
evidentiary hearing on a new theory if the facts and argument originally presented in the
trial court failed on appeal, while the prosecutor who endeavored to present all evidence
and argument relevant to the matter in the original proceedings would be denied remand,
as set forth in Case, Hodson, and Gutierrez.
To the extent such competing standards could exist under Utah law, the standards
would encourage prosecutors to test an initial theory in the trial court and to keep an
alternative theory in reserve until an appeal in the case. On appeal, the prosecutor, lying
in wait, would present afreshargument for affirming the trial court's ruling, and would be
assured remand if the case could not be upheld on the original theory. Conceivably, if the
prosecutor had several alternative theories to test an appeal at a time, a criminal defendant
could expect repeated trips to the appellate court, several evidentiary hearings, protracted
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litigation, and no foreseeable resolution. Such a practice would invite abuse.
Also, the state's argument for the competing standards is in conflict with the rules
of criminal procedure. According to Rule 1, "These rules are intended and shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of
unnecessary expense and delay." Utah R. Crim. P. 1(b). Under the rules, the state should
not be entitled to another hearing on remand if it has withheld evidence and argument in
the original proceedings. Such a practice would undermine the purpose of the rule.
As a matter of due process, Fourth Amendment law, and simple logic, since the
state has the burden of establishing the admissibility of evidence obtained during a
warrantless search, the factual predicate for the admissibility of such evidence must be
fully developed before appeal. The state is bound by the record it created during the
evidentiary hearing in the original trial court proceedings.4 If a proper factual predicate
has not been developed to justify application of a Fourth Amendment doctrine, the state is
not entitled to yet another bite at the apple. Under Utah law, it would be improper and
fundamentally unfair to remand a case for further proceedings on a Fourth Amendment

4 In practice, where the trial prosecutor investigates the facts and the law relating to the
state's argument for admissibility of the evidence under the Fourth Amendment, it is
reasonable to assume the prosecutor is informed of all relevant facts at the time of the original evidentiary hearing. Since the prosecutor has ethical obligations as they relate to
matters presented in the trial court, the trial prosecutor likely has determined which arguments may be pursued in good faith, and which arguments must be discarded. See Utah
R. Prof. Cond. 3.8, comment ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice
and not simply that of an advocate"). The prosecutor likely did not argue the alternative
ground for affirmance here because it was inapplicable. See Wells, 928 P.2d at 391 n.7.
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issue in order that the state may present additional evidence on a new theory.
In State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346, 37 P.3d 270, {petition for cert, filed on
other grounds), Case No. 20020002SC, the court of appeals refused to remand a case to
the trial court for further proceedings on the state's argument for application of the
inevitable-discovery doctrine. Warren is similar to this case where the state failed in the
original trial court proceedings to adequately develop the alternative argument.
In Warren, the court stated the following:
The State argues that even if the search was unlawful, this case should be
remanded to the trial court to determine if the seizure of cocaine and paraphernalia
from Warren's person was nonetheless justified under the "inevitable discovery"
exception to the exclusionary rule. "Inevitable discovery is a valid exception to
the exclusionary rule[.]" State v. Topanotes, 2000 UT App 31 l,1j 10, 14 P.3d 695.
However, under the inevitable discovery doctrine, the State has the burden to "'establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately would
have been discovered by lawful means.'" Id. (quoting [James, 2000 UT 80,]f 16]).
In making its argument, the State correctly points out that the trial court did
not make findings of fact addressing this issue. The State argues the trial court
should have the opportunity to do so now. However, in so arguing the State fails
to recognize that this lack of findings relevant to inevitable discovery was not due
to some lapse or oversight by the trial court, or even to a mistake of law. Rather,
the State failed to timely advance the theory or present evidence to support it.
Although the State bore the burden of proving that the evidence would
inevitably have been discovered by lawful means, not one word about inevitable
discovery was mentioned during the suppression hearing itself. No evidence in
contemplation of that theory was introduced by the State, nor was it mentioned in
the brief oral argument that concluded the hearing. Rather, the idea surfaced for
the first time only in subsequent briefing and a later round of oral arguments when
it was raised, with apologies for its untimeliness, by a different prosecutor than the
one who handled the actual suppression hearing.
Warren, 2001 UT App 346, 1fl[l7-l9.
In Topanotes' case, the state had two opportunities in the trial court to present
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evidence or argument relating to admissibility of the evidence under the Fourth Amendment. On July 15, 1999, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing where the state called
witnesses to testify. At the end of the hearing, the state presented argument for admissibility of the evidence. When the court asked for further argument, the prosecutor passed.
(R. 88:47-57.) On July 28, 1999, before the trial court ruled on the motion to suppress,
the prosecutor again had an opportunity to supplement the record. When the trial court
invited both counsel to present additional argument, the prosecutor submitted the matter
based on the evidence and arguments already contained in the record. (R. 98:3.)
Prior to the trial court's ruling, the prosecutor could not have known whether the
judge would suppress the evidence or find it admissible. Since the state's argument went
to the admissibility of the evidence under the Fourth Amendment, the prosecutor should
have presented all argument relevant to the matter. The prosecutor chose the argument he
would pursue based on his investigation of the facts and circumstances. He chose not to
argue any alternative theory for admissibility of the evidence. See supra note 4, herein.
"Here, the trial court was presented with a presumably conscious decision," Litherland,
2000 UT 76, %31, by the prosecutor, where he twice represented to the court that he had
nothing further to add in connection with the motion to suppress.
If this Court were to allow another evidentiary hearing for development of a theory
the prosecutor chose not to pursue below, such a practice would create an incentive for
abusive practices. The state's argument for remand must be rejected.
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C. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THE STATE'S "CONTINUUM" THEORY
EXISTS. THIS CASE FALLS ON THE MONTOYA SIDE. WHERE THE
RECORD "CLEARLY REBUTS" THE STATE'S CLAIMS FOR APPLICATION
OF THE INEVITABLE-DISCOVERY DOCTRINE.
Even if the state is correct about the "continuum," where some issues raised first
on appeal may be remanded for another hearing (see Brief of Resp. at 7-9), the state's
newly raised theory in this case falls on the Montoya side of the "continuum." The record
here "clearly rebuts" application of the new theory. (Id.); see Montoya, 937 P.2d at 150
(rejecting state's alternative ground, where it was not supported by sufficient "uncontroverted evidence"); Wells, 928 P.2d at 390-92 (rejecting state's argument raised first on
appeal, where the argument was not supported), affd, 939 P.2d 1204 (unanimously
affirming court of appeals' analysis). Remand for another hearing is inappropriate.
In this case, the state claims inevitable-discovery applies based on the following:
The inevitable discovery rule allows the admission of evidence if, "'the
prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information
ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.'" Indeed, the
issue in determining "inevitable discovery" is what would have occurred if the
investigation had continued without the illegality. Thus, the inevitable discovery
rule permits "the prosecution to purge the taint of illegally obtained evidence by
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such evidence inevitably would
have been discovered, absent the illegality, by proper and predictable police
investigative procedures."
(Brief of Resp. at 16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).)5

5 The state also claims the following: "The majority of the courts follow the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which requires no absolute proof, beyond evidence of
predictable police routine, of what would have hypothetically occurred absent the
illegality." (Brief or Resp. at 16 (citing U.S. v. Larsen. 127 F.3d 984, 987 (10th Cir.
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In its brief, the state admits the illegality in this case occurred when the police
escalated the voluntary encounter with Topanotes to a level-two detention without
reasonable suspicion. See Deitman. 739 P.2d at 617-18 (level-two detention must be
supported by reasonable suspicion). The officers "failed to return [Topanotes5] identification before running the warrants check"; "the detention was not justified by reasonable
suspicion"; and the "detention engendered by retaining [Topanotes'] identification [for
the purpose of the warrants check] was not justified under the Fourth Amendment."
(BriefofResp.at2, 19.)
The state also acknowledges that the officers described the process for obtaining
Topanotes' identification and running the warrants check as a "routine procedure" or
"common practice." (Brief of Resp. at 19); see also R. 88:15-16 (Officer Hansen
admitted the officers called in the warrants check as a matter of "routine procedure" and

1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 1140 (1998)).) That statement is misleading.
In Larsen the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit looked to the
primary facts of record to support application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine. A
complete discussion of Larsen is set forth in the opening Brief of Petitioner at 16-20. In
sum, an officer in Larsen unlawfully seized defendant's bank records and forwarded them
to an agent for investigation. A bank vice-president also independently forwarded
defendant's records to a federal agent. A subsequent investigation of the records led to
grand jury proceedings and charges against defendant for fraud. Id. at 985. The defendant
moved to suppress the records that were unlawfully seized by the officer. The district
court and the court of appeals ruled that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applied to the
matter. Id at 986. According to the facts, the FBI agent inevitably would have
discovered the fraud through lawful means, where the bank vice-president also forwarded
information to the agent. The evidence in Larsen supporting inevitable-discovery was
non-speculative and certain. See Nix v. Williams. 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5 (1984) (the
inevitable-discovery doctrine is not based in speculation).
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not because they suspected any criminal activity on Topanotes' part).
Officer Mitchell testified to his "common practice" as follows: "As I walked up,
[Officer Hansen] handed me [Topanotes'] identification and I don't recall if he asked me
to run her for warrants or if I just ran her for warrants. It's a common practice." (R.
88:21-22.) Mitchell also admitted that he did not have reason to suspect that Topanotes
was involved in criminal activity. (R. 88:28.) The evidence supports that Mitchell's
common practice was to detain individuals for the purpose of running a warrants check,
even where he did not have reasonable suspicion to support the detention.
Since the officers here routinely detained a person without reasonable suspicion
when they ran a warrants check, they routinely crossed a constitutional line.
To that end, the evidence rebuts the state's claim that a "routine procedure" may
support inevitable discovery. Indeed, the routine procedure here was found to be unlawful. See Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311, *H2-8 (ruling detention for warrants check was
unlawful). On that basis, the "routine procedure" cannot serve to support inevitable
discovery. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 (state must show evidence ultimately would have
been discovered by lawful means).
Next, the state claims, "[i]f police here had merely viewed the identification,
obtained the desired information, and promptly returned it, the warrants check would not
have 'per se escalate[d] the encounter into a level two stop.'" (Brief of Resp. at 18.) That
is irrelevant. The state might as well claim that if these officers followed Topanotes in
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her daily tasks, they may observe jaywalking to support an arrest and a search incident
thereto. Either way, the argument is based on hypothetical facts. That is inappropriate.
Stated another way, the state's argument does not support predictable, inevitable
discovery. If we were to assume for purposes of this appeal that officers considered
running a warrants check without retaining Topanotes' card and without detaining her, it
is unclear how the check would have occurred. Here, the officer who initially retained
possession of the card (Officer Hansen) did not run the warrants check. Hansen took the
identification card and reviewed it. If he had returned it to Topanotes, under the state's
hypothetical, it is unclear how Officer Mitchell would have obtained Topanotes'
identification to run the check. The state fails to explain that gap in the evidence.
In that regard, the facts in this case rebut a situation where one officer would
review the identification card and return it, while a second officer somehow would obtain
the information to run a warrants check. See State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 764 (Utah
1991) (the leap from asking a person's name to running a warrants check degenerated into
an attempt to support an as yet "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch'").
Also, assuming arguendo the officers did not engage in an illegal detention, when
Hansen hypothetically returned the card to Topanotes, was she free to go? If so, did she?
If she left, the evidence of record in this case supports that the officers would not have
conducted the warrants check. According to Hansen, he would have ended the encounter
and discontinued any further investigation relating to Topanotes. (R. 88:17.) Those facts
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clearly rebut the state's inevitable-discovery argument.
Finally, even if we were to assume that the officers could continue the search without detaining Topanotes, there is no way to know that officers "inevitably" would have
found her after the check. Likewise, there is no way to know whether Topanotes would
have changed her clothes, and if so, how officers would have discovered the drugs in the
clothes she wore earlier. In short, the record fails to support "inevitable" discovery.
Indeed, the state's argument simply raises unanswered questions and speculation.
[T]here is absolutely no evidence in the record that would sustain findings in
support of a determination that discovery of the drugs and paraphernalia on
[defendant's] person would have been inevitable, along the lines theorized by the
State on appeal, even [absent the illegality].
Warren, 2001 UT App 346, ^[20. "There was no testimony that the officers would have
been able to quickly locate" Topanotes after a warrants check since she was free to go, or
that she "still would have had narcotics and paraphernalia on [her] person at the time of
any such later encounter." Id at ^[20.
The state's speculative hypothetical for application of the inevitable-discovery
doctrine is contrary to Nix. There, the United States Supreme Court specified that the
inevitable-discovery doctrine must be supported by "demonstrated historical facts capable
of ready verification or impeachment." Nix. 467 U.S. at 444, n.5. Application of the
doctrine may not be based in speculation. See State v. Miller. 709 P.2d 225, 242 (Or.
1985) ("[i]t is not enough to show that the evidence 'might' or 'could have been'
otherwise obtained") (citing U.S. v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1983) (the officers
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must be certain that evidence would otherwise have been found; it is not enough that
lawful means of acquiring the evidence existed); U.S. v. Romero. 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir.
1982) (warning against resort to speculation, and stressing that the evidence in the case
would have been discovered shortly through a lawful investigation already under way)).
That is, the government must present basic, primary evidence of the lawful means
that ultimately would have led to the discovery. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 448-49 (prosecution
presented specific evidence to support that officers were searching roads, ditches,
abandoned buildings, in area counties in an effort to find the body; continuation of the
lawful search inevitably would lead to the body, which was actually discovered during an
unlawful confession); see Brief of Petitioner, dated October 4, 2001, at 16-20.
The state is unable to make that showing. The evidence refutes application of the
inevitable-discovery doctrine in this case.
D. IN THE END. IF REMAND IS ORDERED. IT MUST BE LIMITED TO A
DETERMINATION ON THE EXISTING RECORD.
As set forth in the opening Brief of Petitioner, Utah appellate courts have specified
that remand is limited to the entry of findings based on the facts already exiting in the
record. See Giron, 943 P.2d at 1121 (ordering remand "for the trial court to apply the law
as set forth in this opinion on the evidence previously presented to the trial court at the
hearing on the motion to suppress"); Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1140 (remand for findings under
correct application of the law); Genovesl 871 P.2d at 548-50, 552 (remand for findings
on the existing record), connected case. State v. Genovesu 909 P.2d at 919; Rucker, 598
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P.2d at 1338-39 (remand for proper findings in accordance with the evidence).
The state attempts to distinguish Giron, Lopez, Rucker, and Genovesi. It claims
those cases do not involve "alternative grounds for affirmance." (Brief of Resp. at 1112.) By that statement, the state seems to claim competing standards exist for remanding
cases in this jurisdiction. (See Brief of Resp. 11-12, 9 ).
The state's argument should be disregarded as set forth supra, in subpoint B,
above. The state's competing standards for an evidentiary hearing on remand (which
would permit a prosecutor to withhold evidence and argument in order that he may test a
new theory on appeal) offend public policy, and should be rejected.
In the event this Court considers it necessary to remand this case to the trial court
for any further proceedings, remand should be limited to findings on the existing record
relating to application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the Brief of Petitioner and herein, Topanotes respectfully requests that this Court vacate the court of appeals' remand order as it relates to the
inevitable-discovery doctrine. In addition, Topanotes requests that this Court rule on the
state's newly raised ground for affirmance, and reject it on the existing record.
In the event this Court deems it necessary to remand this case to the trial court for
further proceedings, Topanotes respectfully requests that this Court specifically limit the
matter to a remand for proceedings on the existing record.
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